“Poor and wealthy hand-to-mouth households in Belgium”
Published, Review of Economics of the Household,
November 2023
with
Laurens Cherchye
,
Thomas Demuynck
,
Bram De Rock
, Geoffrey Minne, Maite De Sola Perea and
Frederic Vermeulen
We identify the population shares of poor hand-to-mouth households, wealthy hand-to-mouth households and non hand-to-mouth households in Belgium. We apply the methodology proposed by Kaplan & Violante (2014) and Kaplan et al., (2014) to the Belgian component of the Household Finance and Consumption Survey. We find that the fraction of hand-to-mouth households in Belgium is substantial and predominantly consists of wealthy hand-to-mouth households. We also compare the observable characteristics and marginal propensities to consume (MPCs) of the three household types. Belgian wealthy hand-to-mouth households have characteristics that resemble those of the non hand-to-mouth households, while their MPCs are often more similar to those of the poor hand-to-mouth households. This pleads for giving a unique place to each type of household when evaluating the effects of fiscal policy
“Housing Wealth, Marital Stability and Labor Supply: an Intertemporal Analysis” (submitted)
with
Bram De Rock
and
Tom Potoms
“Personality traits, the marriage market, and household
behavior”
with
Gastón P. Fernández
“Optimistic Divorce Beliefs and the Life-Cycle Economics of the Family”
with
Ursula Berresheim and David Koll
Nearly half of U.S. marriages end in divorce, yet spouses plan as if theirs will not. Our survey shows married individuals underestimate their divorce risk against three benchmarks. We embed these beliefs in a life-cycle model with endogenous divorce, fertility, and learning-by-doing human capital. Optimistic couples specialize more and have children earlier, leaving secondary earners with less human capital, which persists after divorce. Correcting beliefs closes about 6% of the gender earnings gap and 7% of the long-run child penalty. The expected welfare cost of optimism is small but concentrated among failed marriages.
“Everyone cares: Preferences over childcare and work”
(Draft coming soon)
with
Bram De Rock, Sarah Rosenberg, and Roel van Veldhuizen
We elicit preferences over ideal childcare allocations and the willingness-to-accept alternatives. Our results demonstrate that the dominant ideal is for young children to spend most of their time at home, with an egalitarian split between parents. Analyzing responses to alternatives reveals that people prioritize children’s time at home with any parent over achieving their ideal parental split, and the aversion to more daycare is substantial: the median willingness-to-accept an alternative with dual full-time working parents and full-time daycare is nearly five times the average cost of daycare in the United States. The ideal level of home care and the aversion to more daycare time is statistically indistinguishable between men and women, suggesting a strong shared preference for parental care, rather than a preference for maternal care.
“Skills, Personalities, and AI Adoption”
(Draft coming soon)
with
Thimo De Schouwer and Gastón P. Fernández
Workers often have substantial discretion in the decision to adopt generative AI. In fact, worker traits are better at predicting adoption than the job. We ask which workers adopt, and why. To do so, we use representative United States survey data to estimate a two-sided matching model with an endogenous technology choice. Workers adopt based on the returns they expect from the technology. This separates adoption into four channels, capturing the actual productive returns, erroneous beliefs about these returns, the enjoyment of using the technology, and learning costs. We find that skills determine adoption through every channel, but mostly through a real productive return. Age and personality run almost entirely through learning costs. Skilled workers understate what they would gain, which dampens the skill gap in adoption. Two policies have opposite effects: better information sends the technology to the workers who gain most but widens every gap in who uses it, while cheaper learning closes those gaps and spreads it to workers who gain less.